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Summary: This article describes one of the economic experiments for investigation of 
the free-rider problem. The problem is based on the desire to maximize individual profit by the 
avoidance of the participation in expenses. 
Special network software was created for checking behavioral hypotheses in condition 
of the conflict between individual profit and public benefit. 
At the beginning of this article you can find description of the experiment and its 
modifications. After that the main aspects of the software implementation of the experiment are 
described. Finally, some experimental results are presented. These results correspond with 
relevant results, described in literature. 
Key words: economical experiment, free-rider problem, behavior of economic agents, 
hypotheses of a rational choice, cooperation effect, public benefit, network software. 
Анотація: У даній статті описано один з економічних експериментів для 
дослідження так званої проблеми «безбілетника». Дана проблема проявляється у бажанні 
агента отримати максимальний прибуток шляхом ухилення від участі у витратах. 
Для перевірки поведінкових гіпотез при конфлікті між індивідуальною вигодою і 
суспільним благом було створено спеціальне мережеве програмне забезпечення. 
На початку роботи описується суть експерименту і його модифікації. Після чого 
представлені основні аспекти програмної реалізації експерименту. У заключній частині 
наводяться деякі результати проведених експериментів, які узгоджуються з теоретичними 
аспектами, описаними в літературі. 
Ключові слова: економічний експеримент, проблема безбілетника, поведінка 
економічних агентів, гіпотези раціонального вибору, ефект співпраці, суспільна користь, 
мережеве програмне забезпечення. 
Аннотация: В данной статье описан один из экономических экспериментов для 
исследования так называемой проблемы «безбилетника». Данная проблема проявляется в 
желании агента получить максимальную выгоду посредством уклонения от участия в 
затратах.  
Для проверки поведенческих гипотез при конфликте между индивидуальной 
выгодой и общественным благом было создано специальное сетевое программное 
обеспечение.  
В начале работы описывается суть эксперимента и его модификации. После чего 
представлены основные аспекты программной реализации эксперимента. В 
заключительной части приводятся некоторые результаты проведенных экспериментов, 
которые согласовываются с теоретическими аспектами, описанными в литературе. 
Ключевые слова: экономический эксперимент, проблема безбилетника, 
поведение экономических агентов, гипотезы рационального выбора, эффект 
сотрудничества, общественная польза, сетевое программное обеспечение. 
 
Laboratory experiments in economics have two main goals: first is to check initial 
axioms and hypotheses of economic theories and second is to accumulate data in 
order to formulate new assumptions and axioms. Basic axioms of economic 
analysis are first of all behavioral prerequisites: assumptions about goals, motives, 
and reactions of people in the process of making economic decisions. It is hardly 
surprising that experimental economics integrates research devoted to people’s 
behavior as it is exactly the basis of economic phenomena and processes both on 
micro and macro levels.   
One of the basic areas of experimental economy is analysis of behavior 
properties which appear in cooperation. We can distinguish the public goods (the 
goods of the joint using which have a property of access exclusiveness for which 
there are effective decentralized maintenance mechanisms) and the public goods, 
i.e. the goods of the joint using, for which such mechanisms don't exist. This 
statement of the traditional theory of the public goods is deduced from assumptions 
concerning behavior of economic agents (hypotheses of a rational choice). The 
criterion of the maximum individual profit strongly stimulates the agent to avoid 
the participation in expenses while the property nonexclusive access grants him 
receiving of his goods. This effect, known as a free-rider problem, doesn't allow 
providing the public goods in optimum volume. 
This paper is devoted exactly to modeling and software implementation of 
some laboratory experiment for checking behavioral hypotheses in condition of the 
conflict between individual profit and public benefit. 
Motivation structure of individuals’ behavior is based on the two main 
premises: existence of individual’s interest in the results and influence of general 
rules on the behavior of one particular individual and other society participants’ 
behavior (reciprocity hypothesis).  
Software experiment is developed to confirm foreign results in the 
following main leads:  
existence of behavioral inclination to the cooperation (reciprocity 
hypothesis checking); 
influence of punishment on the behavior and the cooperation effect. 
The experiment structure 
Participants of the experiment (number of participants is n> 1) have the 
equal income d> 0 from which everyone independently allocates the contribution 
xi, 0 ≤ xi ≤ d, to the total fund. The cumulative contribution of all participants is 
multiplied by the known coefficient k> 1, i.e. effect of cooperation (the public 
goods) is modeled. The received result is equally distributed between participants, 
i.e. participants will receive the identical income yi from the total fund, 









1, , where x - the average contribution. 
The final income of the participant as a result of cooperation will be equal 
to 
xkxdyxdz iiii  . 
In case when k> n, the participant receives a profit from his nonzero 
contribution irrespective from actions of other participants that provides his strong 
motivation to participate in the fund, based on the individual interest.  
Under a condition k <n the dependence of the income of the participant 
sharply amplifies from the behavior of others: he can receive both a profit, and 
loss. This condition provides the participants motivation to free-riders behavior 
because in this case they lose nothing, and can win only. 
The experiment description 
Various modifications of a base design of this experiment depending on 
research problems are known. We implemented the experiment with repetitions 
(rounds), and with the termination of game unknown to participants. Besides, the 
punishment (penalty) can be introduced in our experiment: participants acquire the 
right to fine each other, thus punishment can be not free for finer. For finding-out 
the influence of the factors connected with reputation, games with constant and 
variable structure of groups are spent. The structure of groups is known only to the 
experimenter, and doesn't change during game. 
The gist of the experiment is as follows (fig. 1). 
The experiment is carried out with 
participation of one or several independent 
from each other groups containing N persons 
each and an experimenter. The experimenter 
sets up initial conditions: the number of 
rounds, the number of participants in each 
group, the profit for each participant at the 
beginning of the experiment, the 
multiplicative bonus coefficient, the 
multiplicative fine coefficient and whether the 
profit will be added at the beginning of each 
round and if yes then its amount. Besides the 
experimenter specifies whether the participant 
knows who fines him.  
The game begins simultaneously after 
all participants authorize themselves. At the 
beginning of the game each participant gets 
some profit and knows the bonus and fine 
coefficients which he can get.  At the 
beginning of each round each participant gets or does not get an additional profit 
(depending on the parameters of the experiment). In each round participants are 
suggested to make some investment into the total fund and everyone knows not 
only the amount of his own investment but those of all others. The total amount of 
investment is multiplied by the bonus coefficient and divided equally among all 
participants. After getting his bonus the participant has the right to fine his 
competitors (the chosen participant pays the fine calculated as pay for fine 
multiplied by the fine coefficient). Depending on the system options the participant 
either can see who fined him and how much or can see only the total amount of the 
fine. Funds that are fines and fine payments do not take part in the further game.  If 
the participant was bankrupted, the experimenter chooses one of three variants: to 
exclude it from experiment, to finish the experiment or to give out the additional 
Fig. 1 The gist of  the experiment. 
3 - participant, 
1 - profit source, 
2 - total fund, 
6- getting bonuses, 
4, 5 - profit and investment payment. 
income to all participants of experiment in order to make the balance of all 
participants positive. 
Experiment ends when either all rounds 
end or experimenter decides so. 
The experimenter controls the game so 
that he can see all activities in the system: the 
number of participants’ profits and bonuses, their 
investments and fines. During the experiment all 
data are stored in the text file and in Excel format 
file for further processing. 
After the experiment the participants fill 
in questionnaires to find out the relations between 
their behavior and personal characteristics (such 
as age, sex, education etc.). 
Despite the fact that this topic is urgent, 
similar experiments which are carried out “by 
hand” are described in the literature. After 
searching on the Internet some software which can automate this process, only one 
program was found (z-Tree) that is developed in Zurich 
(http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree/index.php). However it has some imperfections: there 
is no Russian interface (Russian language is provided, but it doesn't work), 
therefore we have to work with the German interface; Help is absent (system has 
huge number of adjustments, but they aren't described); the program is free, but 
licensed that leads to difficulty of its obtaining.. 
Experiment implementation. 
For carrying out of experiments the network software is developed. The 
cascade lifecycle model has been applied to its creation according to standard 
ISO/IEC 12207 [http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=43447]. 
All stages of lifecycle have 
been implemented. 
On fig. 4, 5 Use-case 
diagrams of the experimenter 
and the participant are shown. 
 
Fig. 3 Participant window. 
 
Рис. 5 Use-case of  the experimenter. 
On fig. 7. The class diagram of the developed model is presented. 
The main class is class Experiment. It includes an array of objects of class 
Group and the link to the experimenter (class Experimentator). Each group consists 
of several participants (class Member). An array of results of each round of 
experiment (class Result) is stored in the participant. Result includes the data about 
the income of the participant in the beginning of the round, his investments, 
bonuses and fines. 
The program is implemented on Java (Herbert Shildt SWING: A 
BEGINNER'S GUIDE. — М: "Williams", 2007. — With. 704. — ISBN 0-07-
226314-8), the data is stored using SQL Server. To remove the necessity of setting 
up additional software, and also for transfer convenience of all database, the 
portable version of a SQL Server was used (SQLite, http:// 
www.xerial.org/trac/Xerial/wiki/SQLiteJDBC). For network implementation 
TCP/IP protocol has been used. 
All data about an experiment can be saved in Excel format for its 
subsequent handling (the library jxl.jar 
(http://jexcelapi.sourceforge.net/ is used 
for this purpose). 
Results of experiment 
Results of experiments carried 
out using the developed simulation model 
don't contradict with results which are 
described in the literature [2, 4, 6]: 
1. People cooperate and punish 
each other in anonymous single-valued 
games where the future advantage from 
cooperation and effects of reputation are 
eliminated. It gives acknowledgement of 
a hypothesis of existence by strong reciprocity in behavior of people. 
2. The effect of fading cooperation in games with repetitions can be 
observed: in the beginning participants make high payments, but with 
magnification of repetitions cooperation "reserve" runs out – investments become 
substantially smaller. Cooperation slump can be explained by presence of people 
with different motivation in group: the behavior of "free riders" with their 
especially individualistic motivation exerts a disappointing influence on the 
participants inclined in cooperation. 
3. Participants are inclined to punish those who make smaller 
investment. The given conclusion has been essentially extended by results of the 
researches carried out in the countries of the former USSR: the effect of “antisocial 
punishment” when people punish not only those who makes smaller investment, 
but also those who makes bigger one is observed. 
4. Punishment increases and stabilizes the cooperation on higher level in 
comparison with experiments without punishment. It is confirmed with numerous 
experiments though there are also exceptions: punishment is ineffective, if it is 
 
Рис. 6 Use-case of  the participant. 
interpreted as the unfair. Experiments show that the exogenous (imputed) norms of 
punishment are less effective [8]. 
5. The strategic nature of interaction (the single game or with repetitions) 
has no essential value for punishment. People punish "free riders" both in repeated 
relations and in the single interactions. The punishment is often the most 
considerable in the last period of game that is incompatible with the model of 
egoistical rationality of the individual. Observations give the base to suppose that 
cooperation level is formed under the influence of strategic reasons whereas 
punishment is dictated by the impulse caused by the negative emotions, connected 
with partners «bad» behavior. It should be noted that punishment is normally used 
at weekly expressed cooperation which is typical for the beginning of the 
experiment, and it confirms its emotionality and short-sightedness [9]. 
For carrying out of the experiments that allow to research behavior of 
people from various social groups at the public goods allocation the model has 
been developed and the network software is implemented. Results of experiment 
are saved for the subsequent handling in Excel. Handling is carried out to check of 
hypotheses of various people behavior and their inclination to cooperation, and 
also influence of punishment on behavior and effect of cooperation. 
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